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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CHARLES N. BENNETT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vs-

CASE NO. 16268

DONNA MAE BENNETT,
Defendant-Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

PETITION' FOR REHEARING
The Defendant-Respondent, DONNA MAE BENNETT, hereafter
referred to as the RESPONDENT, hereby petitions this Honorable
Court for a rehearing of the judgment rendered on February 20,
1980, wherein this Court set aside its October 19, 1979, per
curiam decision sustaining the Lower Court property settlement,
reversed the judgment of the Lower Court and remanded for
proceedings concerning property distribution between the parties.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REHEARING
The Respondent seeks reversal of the decision of the
Supreme Court of the State of Utah as the same is contained in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the decision rendered February 20, 1980, and to have the
decision of the Utah Supreme Court of October 19, 1979, reinstated.

In the alternative, Respondent prays for either

an evidentiary hearing before the said Utah Supreme Court
in its exercise of equitable jurisdiction or that the matter
be remanded to the Lower District Court for a full hearing on
the new evidence contained in Exhibit "A" of this brief.
ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT WAS PERSUADED THAT THE ONLY
ASSET OF THE MARRIAGE THAT WAS AVAILABLE
FOR IMMEDIATE SALE AND DIVISION BETWEEN THE
PARTIES AT THE TIME OF TRIAL WAS THE FAMILY
DWELLING.
THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO CONSIDER
THE $15,682.00 PAYROLL· DEDUCTIONS AS AN
ASSET IN THE POSSESSION OF THE APPELLANT
ONLY IF HE WITHDRAWS THEM AT LEAST ONE
MONTH PRIOR TO RETIREMENT AS AN ASSET
AVAILABLE AT TIME OF TRIAL FOR DISTRIBUTION
· WAS · NOT • ERROR. ( EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.)
THE
ORIGINAL DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT'S
SUSTAINING THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD SHOULD
BE REINSTATED.
It is agreed by all concerned that the only way
Appellant could make the cash value of his contributions
available for either himself or to be divided between the
parties on October 25, 1978, would be to withdraw the
$15,682.00 he has paid in by payroll deduction prior to
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April 7, 1984, or one month before becoming eligible to
retire.
All parties, counsel, witness and the trial court
agree that to make the Appellant's paid-in contributions
immediately available for distribution would totally destroy
Appellant's 37-year retirement.
What is not agreed and the basis for this appeal is
the fact that in making a division of marital assets,-

·~

·

trial court refused to cons:ider 'either :the Appellant•·s: ·$15(6-8'2'.'0·0
of contributions or the matching amount held· by ·the u.: s. Government :as an asset available for immediate di·s:tribution.
The request to have Appe,llant's cash contributions
treated as one of two assets which the court should consider
was made by Appellant's counsel (R-90, L's 19-30 and R-91, L's 1-2).
MR.

VLAHOS:

"Maybe I'm missing something, Your

Honor, but that's not the way I heard the testimony from
anybody in that regard.
"My understanding is that ·the· other mon:ey; was put

into retirement fund and he could not touch it, had
no control over it, and it went to his heirs, (referring
to the Government matching account) or towards his
annuity.
testimony.

And that's the way I understood Mrs. Woods'
(Material in brackets inserted for clari-

fication).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-3-

"If you are talking about equities, Your Honor,

I

would suggest to the Court that 38,000 net equity, plus
15,682, (Appellant's paid-in contributions) comes out
$53,682.

Divide that by two, is 26,841. ·Subtract: from

tha't p?rti<>n lS,6:8:2·, which my client 'has:· in: his:
leaving a claim of ll,159.

·poss~s:ston,

And if the Court is taking

that position, then I think that would be equity."
(Emphasis supplied).

(Material in brackets added for

clarification).
The trial court rejected the claim of Plaintiff's counsel
that the $15,682.00 of Plaintiff's contributions was money that
Appellant then had in his possession.

The Lower Court was

eminently correct in considering only the $38,000.00 estimated
equity in the family dwelling as immediately available for distribution.

The court made the following observations (R-89,

L's 24-27):
THE COURT:
in the home.

"Thirty-eight thousand is the net equity
Divide that between the two of you, that's

$19,000.00 each.

And deduct from that the retirement,

$15,682.00, that's $3,318.00.

That's the difference

there."
That the $15,682.00 paid into the Civil Service Retirement System by Appellant had a dollar value of $15,682.00 is
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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irrefutable.

That the money was not at that time, and is not

today, in the Appellant's possession is also indisputable not
withstanding the errorneous claims of Appellant's counsel.
It is also an absolute that Appellant had, and has today and will have until one month prior to May 1, 1984, the
right to make the $15,682.00 of his paid-in contributions
available for immediate distribution.

The right to exercise

control over his personal contributions is an incident of
ownership which had at trial, and has today, a present value.
The right to direct to heirs or to receive as an annuity
the $15,682.00 held by the Federal Government in a retirement
fund which Appellant has never seen and has no control over is
also an incident of ownership which Appellant has and had at
time of trial.

If such ownership had been considered by the

court in the same light as the Appellant's paid-in contributions,
the following property award would have resulted:
$38,000.00

Equity in home
Appellant's retirement contributions
U. s. Government matching fund
available only as death or annuity
TOTAL property to be divided
$69,364.00 divided by 2 equals

-s-

lS,682.00

· · ·l:s,·6,e:z.·oo
$69,364.00
: ::;>3:4,:6:S:2.:QQ
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Respondent's award (all the home)
(R-92, L-5)
Less Appellant's lien of $5,000.00
TOTAL to Respondent

$38, ooo. oo
· · ·-:5:

,·o·O'o-.·oo

: :s:3:3 ,:Q:O:O:.:Q 0

Had the trial court believed the errorneous claim made
by Appellant's counsel that the Appellant had his paid-in contributions of $15,682.00 in his possession (R-90, L's 29-30) and
thus available for immediate division between the parties, the
following division would have been proper:
l.

A lien to Appellant for $19,000.00 on family residance.

2.

Equity award to Respondent $19,000.00, family
residence.

3.

Cash award to Respondent $7, 891. 00 from Appellant's
retirement contributions.

4.

Appellant's retirement $7,891.00 on deposit in his
retirement account.
TOTAL equity to each party

$19,000.00

TOTAL cash to each party

$ 7,891.00

GRAND TOTAL cash and lien to
each party

$26, 891. 00

The problem is that to consider both the equity in the
family dwelling and the cash value of the Appellant's contributions equally available for immediate distribution would
-6Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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destroy at least half, if not all, of the value of the Appellant's 37 years of Federal Civil Service unless he were to be
ordered to borrow $7,891.00 from other sources to pay to
Respondent in lieu of withdrawing half of his retirement
contributions.
Working within the limitations of the assets and the
facts before it, the trial court chose to preserve both the
family dwelling and the full value of Appellant's Federal
retirement without imposing the hardship of additional debt
on the Appellant, and that determination should be reinstated
and sustained by this Honorable Court.
The confusion is apparently caused by the attempt by
Appellant to persuade the trial court that Appellant should be
awarded one-half of the equity in the parties' home together
with one-half the cash value of his contributions to the
Federal Civil Service retirement and then be allowed to withdraw the entire cash value of his contributions to retirement
again beginning May 7, 1984.

Appellant does not object to

having his cash contributions included in the property settlement even though, as argued orally by his counsel before this
court, Appellant has never seen them, if those contributions
are counted once on October 25, 1978, for 50% of their value
and again on May 7, 1984, for 100% of their value.

-7-

The fact
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is that should Appellant die before May 7, 1984, or retire
(R-76, L's 1-3) on that date, his paid-in contributions would
be counted one and a half times and the value of the

u. s.

Government account would also go to someone other than his
wife of 37 years had the trial court done equity by the
definition offered by Appellant's counsel at pages 90 and 91
of the trial record.
At issue is the question of how should the trial court
value an asset for which Appellant paid 5% to 7% of his salary
and which had a cash value on October 25, 1978, of $15,682.00
but which Appellant does not have in his possession and can
only possess by destroying something of even greater value in
expectancy?
The latitude historically afforded trial courts in
dealing with complicated matters of this kind is broad enough
to sustain the decision of the Lower Court in this case.
POINT II
THE RETIREMENT OFFICER IN THE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
OFFICE AT HILL AIR FORCE BASE, MARGARET S. WOODS,
WAS CALLED AS RESPONDENT'S WITNESS IN THE TRIAL.
THE WITNESS VOLUNTEERED STATEMENTS BEYOND HER
COMPETENCE. THE TRIAL JUDGE OBSERVED HER DEMEANOR
AND ASSESSED THE VALUE TO BE ATTACHED TO THE
VARIOUS PARTS OF HER TESTIMONY INCLUDING THAT
HAVING TO DO WITH THE PRESENT VALUE OF APPELLANT'S
FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT.

-aSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Margaret

s.

Woods, though called as Respondent's witness,

volunteered much information to favor Appellant even when she
lacked specific knowledge of the facts at issue.

Mrs. Woods'

actions came as a surprise to Respondent and her counsel, but
were correctly weighed by the trial judge.

At page 73, line 11

of the trial record, we find:
Q

"Now, can you tell us what the present grade
and step of Charles Bennett is?"

A

"I can, sir ...

* * *
Q

"What is his annual salary before exemptions
and deductions?"

A

"Effective October 5th of '78 -- effective
October 5th, it wou'ld be $18,254.00. But I
must say one thing, sir."

Q

"Go ahead."

A

"Tn behal'f of Mr.: Bennett( r•m :su.re :that
Mr.• Bennett was •not ·aware of• :his• new ·urorease,

because we had no pUblicity on Hill Field, because the President signed it at a late date.
And Mr. Bennett, the employee -- copies have
not been distributed to the employees as of
today. " (Emphasis supplied. )
Q

"You are essentially saying, as of today he
had no official notification of the changes?"

Again at page 77, line 15:
A

"Mr. Bennett would not be authorized to retire until age fifty-five, which would be
May 7th of 1984, would be th~ ea;liest possible date that he could retire.
-9-
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Q

"What would be those monthly benefits on
that date?"

* * *
THE COURT : "She may answer. "
A

"Well, .based .. on.. his .current salaryr· ·of
courses which· could-either go u~, orhe
could.a h1t i:n "RIF and it coulA o down,
speculating, e wou d receive
out .1 70
per month, less his health insurance, if
he stayed with. Alliance. That's currently
about $28.00 per month. Of course, that's
subject to change. So his take-home, about
1042 per month."
(Emphasis supplied.)

The willingness of the witness to offer gratuitous
testimony favorable to Appellant was correctly assessed by the
trial judge who was in a position to observe her demeanor and
to give the proper weight to her evidence.

This Honorable

Court should reinstate its prior decision sustaining the trial
court's division of marital assets.
POINT III
THE QUESTION OF THE PRESENT VALUE OF THE
APPELLANT'S $1,042.00 PER MONTH OF FEDERAL
CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT WHERE THE FIRST
PAYMENT IS DEFERRED TO MAY 7, 1984, SHOULD
NOT BE DECIDED ON THE CONTRADICTORY AND DEMONSTRABLY BIASED TESTIMONY OF RESPONDENT'S
WITNESS.
UNBIASED EXEERT TESTIMONY IS
AVAILABLE (SEE EXHIBIT "A") AND WOULD HAVE
BEEN CALLED AT TRIAL HAD THERE BEEN ANY INDICATION FROM PRIOR INTERVIEWS OF THE BIAS
OF MARGARET WOODS. WHILE NOT APPARENT FROM
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THE MERE WRITTEN RECORD THE
PARENT TO THE TRIAL JUDGE.

BIAS WAS AP-

Respondent's witness, Margaret Woods, testified somewhat reluctantly that Appellant would receive the sum of
$1,042.00 per month beginning at age fifty-five on May 7, 1984.
(R-77).

Exhibit "A" attached to this brief states that the

value of that monthly benefit measured as of the date of trial
was $75,821.00.

Appellant, as of October 25, 1978, had contri-

buted a mere $15,681.00 to that present value.

If only the

contributions of Appellant are taken into account in making
division of the marital assets in this case, Appellant will, in
effect, take for $15,681.00 what any other person would have had
to pay $75,821.00 for on October 25, 1978.
The present value of Appellant's benefit of $75,821.00
is made more certain than that of a non-governmental employee
because it is based on the power of the Federal Government to
levy current taxes.

On the other hand, the investment of the

$75,821.00 by a private individual would be subject to the investment uncertainties of private pension funds.
Even if the funds needed to generate a monthly income
of $1,042.00 with the first payment not due until age fifty-five,
or six years hence, could be invested at a guaranteed long-term
rate equal to the rate today for six-month money market certi-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ficates, i.e., 13%, it would still require $41,507.00 invested
as of October 25, 1978, to provide the $1,042.00

~er

month

income which Appellant will receive from his Federal Civil service
retirement at age fifty-five.

(Exhibit "A"l.

The practical certainty that Appellant will begin
drawing $1,042.00 per month six years hence, at age fifty-five,
is illustrated by the present value of Appellant's $1,200.00 per
month, age 65, retirement benefit at 8%.

It is $28,902.00, and

at 13% a mere $10,693.00 or some $5,000.00 less than his
October 25, 1978, contributions.

(Exhibit "A").

The trial court properly took into account the present
value of Appellant's retirement benefits and exercised proper
discretion in awarding Appellant $5,000.00 as a lien on the
parties' only other asset, the family residence, the lien being
awarded for other than economic reasons.

Respondent's share

$33,000.00, while not equal to Appellant's in dollar value,
recognizes basic emotional and family needs, and should be
affirmed by this Honorable Court.
POINT IV
THE QUESTION OF WHEN THE PRESENT VALUE OF ANY
EXPECTANCY OR PROMISED BENEFIT IS ENCOMPASSED
BY THE LANGUAGE OF ENGLERT V. · ENGLERT, (19 7 8)
UTAH 576 FZd 1274, 1276 MAY BE A MATTER TO BE
DETERMINED ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS. IN THE
-12Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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of

CASE AT BAR, THE POSSESSORY INTEREST OF THE
APPELLANT IN HIS RETIREMENT IS AS ABSOLUTE
AS IS THE PARTIES' POSSESSORY INTEREST IN THE
$38,000.00 EQUITY WHICH ONE APPRAISER ESTIMATED TO BE IN THE FAMILY RESIDENCE.

The present value of Appellant's $1,200.00 per month
retirement benefit at age 65 is $28,902.00, whereas a lessor
monthly benefit of $1,042.00 taken 10 years sooner has a value
today of $75,821.00 or nearly three times more.

Retirement at

age fifty-five with 37 years of Federal service is for all
practical purposes certain.

(Exhibit "A").

When a current money market, six-month interest rate is
used and retirement is deferred to age 65, the present value of
Appellant's $1,200.00 per month retirement benefit shrinks to a
mere $10,693.82 or $5,000.00 less than the amount paid in by
Appellant as of October 25, 1978.

(Exhibit "A").

The Appellant's retirement benefits are totally in his
control and discretion; and were this an estate or inheritance
tax case revolving around a private annuity, the Appellant would,
as a matter of law, be said to have a taxable possessory present
interest in the entire $75,821.00 present value.

When the

Appellant, in the future exercise of his unfettered discretion,
begins to receive a monthly retirement check in excess of
$1,000.00 per month while the Respondent must look forward to

-13Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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10 more years of daily labor, the question of whether Appellant
possessed the present value of the amount necessary to purchase
his retirement benefit on October 25, 1978, will be as academic
as the question of whether or not the parties possessed the
estimated equity in the family residence on the same date.
If one can possess the promise of the Federal Government
to pay the face value of its bonds, treasury bills, or other
evidences of Governmental obligation, then it is respectfully
urged that Appellant possesses, in the case at Bar, the present
value of his Federal Civil Service retirement.
The Employees Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
makes the 100% vesting of non-Governmental retirement benefits
mandatory under the facts here present no matter which vesting
schedule is applied.

In a future case, will such 100% vested

benefits which the employee has the total right to withdraw
both as to his and his employers contributions be fully part of
a marital property division while only the personal contributions
of a Governmental employee may be considered without error?
What of an employee covered by a completely noncontributory retirement plan into which he has personally paid
nothing but has a 100% vested benefit which he may elect to
receive the day after the trial court following the February
20th decision in the case at Bar finds he has no possessory
-14Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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interest and does not include in the division of marital
property?

Suppose the monthly benefit to be the same $1,042.00

and the hypothetical husband or wife to be fifty-five years of.
age with 37 years of service as in the instant case.
On the issue of whether the Appellant's monthly retirement in six years from the trial date is property possessed by
the parties, such a value, which has been determined to be
$75,821.00, is no less in possession of the parties than the
"estimate of value" of the parties' dwelling which gives rise
after subtracting the mortgage debt to the alleged equity of
$38,000.00.
According to Ballentine's Law Dictionary, Third Edition,
at page 85, "To appraise" is to "estimate value."

As applied

here, it is what the parties' home might have sold for had it
been put on the market at the time the appraisal was given.
It appears from the trial record that there were as
many different estimates of value of the parties' dwelling as
there were appraisers.

(R-S, L's 1-15).

Counsel urges that the present value of Appellant's
monthly retirement benefit of $1,042.00 is a certain figure of
$75, 821. oo; and regardless of how many enrolled actuaries apply
the 8% investment figure and the 1971 group annuity male
mortality table, it will always be the same.
-15Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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If the parties possess the estimated equity in their
dwelling, they must possess the mathematical certainty of the
present value of Appellant's monthly retirement benefits and
not just what Appellant has contributed.
Stated another way, if the parties have any greater
value in the marital dwelling than the $12,500.00 principal
for which it was purchased. (R-34), so, surely, do they possess
the greater value of Appellant's retirement than the $15,681.00
which Appellant had contributed as of the trial date.

(R-80).

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted to this Honorable Court
that the question of the present value of Appellant's retirement is a matter of $75,821.00 as valued in today's dollars,
and Respondent is entitled to have a rehearing with an
opportunity to argue the issues of possession, life expectancy,
assured rates of investment return, and the use of the 1971
group annuity, male mortality table to this Honorable Court in
the exercise of its equitable

jurisdiction~

or, in the alterna-

tive, to have a full evidentiary hearing on the issues of present
value and possession at the

~rial

court level.

Respectfully submitted,
/

_I_.

,

J .- Val Rober'ts - - -

-· -.o'
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent
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c;c.1cra1th & Green, Inc.

EXHIBIT "A"

March 3, 1980

Mr. J. Val Roberts
Attorney at Law
43 East 500 South
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Dear Mr. Roberts:
Per your request, we have calculated the actuarial present value of benefits
for a 49 year old male as of October 25, 1978. In making our calculations,
we have relied upon the retirement benefits that were contained in your
letter to our firm dated March 3, 1980.
Based upon this data the present value of benefits are as follows:
Retirement
Age

Monthly
Benefit

55
65

$1,042.00
$1,200.00

8%

Present Value
13%

$75,821.00
$28,902.92

$41,507.48
$10,693.82

Our calculations have been made using the 1971 Group Annuity male mortality
table, at both 8% and 13% compounded annual interest rates.
Sincerely,

5 c.,,..V C

!L

l

cc_ .•- , _ . _ _

Scott C. Morgan
Assistant Actuary

wn
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CERTIFrCATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed on

fla!)&j\... · · ,

thi~ ··//)#</day of

1980, TWO true and correct copies of the

above and foregoing Respondent's Brief, by posting same in
the U.

s. mails, postage prepaid and addressed to the

following counsel of record, to-wit:
Pete N•. Vlahos, Esq.
Vlahos, Knowlton & Perkins
Legal Forum Building
2447 Kiesel Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401
(Attorney for Appellant)

£.fjJ,''~
;j~RfTAR~
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